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OVERCOMING THE CHALLENGES TO ACHIEVING 
JUSTICE FOR SYRIA 
Stephen J. Rapp∗ 
Mass atrocities began to be committed in Syria in March 2011. They were 
launched by the Syrian regime in response to peaceful protests by members of 
the civilian population. Initially, the situation appeared to replicate the one that 
arose in Libya the previous month. Unarmed citizens in the streets were met 
with lethal firepower of a repressive regime, protesters were pursued by the 
security forces into their neighborhoods, and those captured alive were 
imprisoned and brutalized. 
In Libya, it was most famously marches of worshipers exiting Friday 
prayers whose shouted words were met by snipers. It was a regime whose 
supreme leader, Muammar Gaddafi, called the protesters “rats” and 
“cockroaches” and threatened to hunt them down without mercy.1 “We will 
come zenga [neighborhood] by zenga, house by house, room by room. We will 
find you in your closets.”2 In Syria, it was the arrest and torture of fifteen 
school children for painting political slogans on a wall followed by 
demonstrations for their release that were met by security forces opening fire 
on the protestors leaving some dead in the streets.3 At the top of the regime, 
President Bashar al-Assad rejected any accommodation, calling the peaceful 
demonstrators “conspirators” who were planning “sedition.”4 
In both situations, the governments’ repression led to the rise of armed 
opposition groups that eventually controlled territory and turned the situations 
into “non-international armed conflicts.” But even after there were armed 
 
 ∗ Sonia and Harry Blumenthal Distinguished Fellow for the Prevention of Genocide, U.S. Holocaust 
Memorial Museum and The Hague Institute for Global Justice, October 2015–present; Ambassador-at-Large, 
Office of Global Criminal Justice, U.S. Department of State, 2009–2015; Prosecutor, Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, 2007–2009; Senior Trial Attorney and Chief of Prosecutions, International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, 2001–2007. 
 1 John-Paul Ford Rojas, Muammar Gaddafi in His Own Words, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 20, 2011), http:// 
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8838644/Muammar-Gaddafi-in-his-own-
words.html.  
 2 Id. 
 3 Joe Sterling, Daraa: The Spark that Lit the Syrian Flame, CNN (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2012/03/01/world/meast/syria-crisis-beginnings/.  
 4 Id. 
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rebels to fight, the governments continued to bombard civilians who were 
believed to support the rebellions. By the definitions of international criminal 
law, this targeted and indiscriminate violence against civilians became not only 
crimes against humanity but also crimes of war. These acts inevitably led to 
brutality by opposition forces against captured government soldiers or against 
civilian populations thought to be sympathetic to the regimes—acts which 
could also be war crimes, and, if sufficiently systematic or widespread, crimes 
against humanity. 
But the response to the situations in Libya and Syria could not have been 
more different, at least as represented by the United Nations (U.N.) Security 
Council, the one body with the legal authority to take effective action. Within 
fifteen days of the beginning of the protests and repression in Libya the 
Security Council voted 15-0 to adopt Resolution 1970 in order to freeze the 
assets and restrict the travel of the leaders of the Libyan regime and to refer the 
situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for possible prosecution.5 
The ICC Prosecutor immediately launched an investigation and within three 
months requested warrants of arrest against Muammar Gaddafi, the head of 
state; his son Saif Gaddafi, as de facto Prime Minister; and Abdullah al-
Senussi, the Director of Military Intelligence—all for alleged crimes against 
humanity committed before the situation morphed into an armed conflict.6 In 
late June 2011, barely four months after the Security Council referred the 
situation, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber issued warrants for the arrest of the three 
individuals.7 
Well before the ICC warrants were issued, it became apparent that the 
threat of prosecution was not going to deter the Libyan regime. The opposition 
had been able to drive Libyan government forces out of Benghazi and from 
several towns in eastern Libya, but by mid-March there was a successful 
counter-offensive by the Libyan government that threatened to retake Benghazi 
and hunt down its civilian enemies “house-to-house” and “room-to-room.”8 
The response was U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973 that was 
adopted on March 17, 2011, with ten affirmative votes and five abstentions, to 
authorize a “no-fly zone” and “all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians 
 
 5 S.C. Res. 1970, ¶¶ 15, 17 (Feb. 26, 2011). 
 6 Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11, Warrant of Arrest, ¶¶ 2, 4 (June 27, 2011), http://www. 
icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1101337.pdf.  
 7 Id. ¶¶ 95, 99, 102. 
 8 Rojas, supra note 1.  
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and civilian populated areas.”9 Under authority of the resolution, a NATO air 
campaign began with French planes soon in the air targeting the Libyan 
government’s counter-offensive. Over the ensuing months civilians were 
protected, but the operation as a whole was criticized for providing air support 
for opposition forces and having “regime change” as its true goal.10 By 
November, the opposition had won, Gaddafi was dead, and a new government 
was in place. This did not bring stability or security in Libya and the alleged 
“over-reach” of UNSCR 1973 has been a stated reason for opposition to any 
effective action by the U.N. Security Council in Syria.11 
According to a 2013 survey by the Libyan government, about 4,700 rebel 
supporters, armed and civilian, were killed during the 2011 conflict.12 Final 
figures of deaths on the government side have not yet been determined, but are 
unlikely to be greater. About 2,100 are missing on both sides.13 By contrast, 
the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights estimated that the number of dead in 
the Syria conflict reached 250,000 in mid-October 2015, after four and a half 
years of conflict and with no end in sight.14 This has not moved the U.N. 
Security Council. Russian vetoes, cast or threatened, have prevented even the 
approval of targeted economic sanctions or travel bans. After a chemical 
weapons attack in August 2013 in Ghouta, Syria, that cost the lives of about 
1,300 men, women, and children,15 the need to avoid a Russian veto resulted in 
UNSCR 2118 that expressed the “strong conviction” that the responsible 
individuals “should be held accountable,” but did not provide a mechanism for 
doing so.16 
 
 9 Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ Over Libya, Authorizing 
‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions, U.N. Press Release 
SC/10200 (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm; S.C. Res. 1973, ¶¶ 4, 6–12 
(Mar. 17, 2011).  
 10 See, e.g., Coalition Forces Report Progress in Libya Strikes, NAT’L PUBLIC RADIO (Mar. 21, 2011, 
1:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/2011/03/21/134738870/Coalition-Forces-Report-Progress-In-Libya-Strikes.  
 11 See, e.g., Daniel Larison, The Brewing Proxy War in Syria, WEEK (Feb. 6, 2012), http://theweek.com/
articles/478350/brewing-proxy-war-syria.  
 12 Ian Black, Libyan Revolution Casualties Lower Than Expected, Says New Government, GUARDIAN 
(Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/08/libyan-revolution-casualties-lower-expected-
government.  
 13 Id. 
 14 More than 250,000 People Killed in Syria War, i24NEWS (Oct. 17, 2015), http://www.i24news.tv/en/
news/international/middle-east/89266-151017-more-than-250-000-people-killed-in-syria-war.  
 15 Syrian Opposition; 1,300 Killed in Chemical Attack on Ghouta Region, AL ARABIYA NEWS (Aug. 21, 
2013), http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/08/21/Syrian-activists-at-least-500-killed-in-
chemical-attack-on-Eastern-Ghouta.html.  
 16 S.C. Res. 2118, ¶ 15 (Sept. 27, 2013). 
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The idea of referring the Syria situation to the ICC was not put to vote 
during the first three years of the conflict, largely because it was viewed as 
pointless as it would certainly be met by a Russian veto. Finally, in May 2014, 
the French Ambassador to the U.N. formally proposed an ICC referral 
resolution. It attracted thirteen affirmative votes, but was rejected because of 
the vetoes of Russia and China.17 An agreement was reached to eliminate the 
Syrian government’s chemical weapons program and its supply of the lethal 
chemicals was substantially removed and destroyed. However, it was credibly 
reported that the government continued to use poison chlorine gas in the barrel 
bombs that it was dropping on neighborhoods that it believed harbored rebel 
fighters. Without finding anyone responsible, this use of chlorine was 
condemned by the Security Council in UNSCR 2209 adopted in March 2015.18 
Nevertheless, the Syrian government remained incorrigible, and images of 
children dying from chlorine poisoning were brought to the U.N. Security 
Council. Finally, in August 2015, the Council adopted UNSCR 2235 
authorizing an investigation to identify those responsible for the use of 
chemical weapons in Syria.19 Even then, there was no certainty that the 
identified individuals would be subjected to any independent judicial or 
administrative proceeding.20 
By contrast, in the Geneva-based U.N. Human Rights Council (UNHRC), 
the international community acted similarly as to Libya and Syria in mandating 
for each an independent Commission of Inquiry (CoI) to investigate serious 
violations of international human rights law and related crimes. For Libya, the 
first CoI mandate came in a special session of the UNHRC on February 25, 
2011, the day before the UNSC adopted Resolution 1970 referring the Libya 
situation to the ICC.21 The CoI reported to the UNHRC on June 17, 2011.22 As 
 
 17 Press Release, Security Council, Referral of Syria to International Criminal Court Fails as Negative 
Votes Prevent Security Council from Adopting Draft Resolution, U.N. Press Release SC/11407 (May 22, 
2014), http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11407.doc.htm.  
 18 Press Release, Security Council, Adopting Resolution 2209 (2015), Security Council Condemns Use 
of Chlorine Gas as Weapon in Syria, U.N. Press Release SC/11810 (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.un.org/press/
en/2015/sc11810.doc.htm.  
 19 S.C. Res. 2235, ¶ 5 (Aug. 7, 2015).  
 20 Louis Charbonneau, U.N. Chief Sets Out Framework for Syria Poison Gas Investigation, REUTERS 
(Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/27/us-mideast-crisis-syria-chemicalweapons-idUS
KCN0QW2M420150827.  
 21 Situation of Human Rights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Rep. of the Human Rights Council on its, 
Seventeenth Session, U.N. Doc. No. A/66/53, at 25–27 (June 17, 2011). 
 22 Id. at 170–71. 
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the conflict and violations were then continuing, it was re-mandated, and after 
the end of the conflict, the Libya CoI filed its final report in February 2012.23 
For Syria, the UNHRC, acting in a special session in April 2011, first 
mandated an investigative mission by the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR).24 In a subsequent special session in August 2011, a 
formal CoI was created, and its mandate has been renewed an unprecedented 
seven times.25 Chaired by Paulo Pinheiro of Brazil, the CoI has made 
numerous requests to the Syrian government for cooperation with its 
investigations, in particular to permit it to investigate in Syria. All of the 
requests have been denied. It has performed its investigation largely through 
oral interviews conducted from outside Syria, and completed 3,840 such 
interviews from September 2011 through August 2015.26 It has reported to the 
UNHRC ten times.27 The length of its reports was regulated by U.N. rules that 
limited them to about twenty-three printed pages.28 However, its reports are 
often appended with extensive annexes detailing its findings as to the 
multiplicity of violations, victims, and perpetrators. For example, its February 
2013 report included eighty pages of annexes describing ten different ways in 
which the Syrian people were suffering and dying: “Unlawful killing: 
massacres,” “Other unlawful killing,” “Arbitrary arrest and detention,” 
“Enforced disappearance,” “Torture and other forms of ill-treatment,” “Sexual 
violence,” “Violations of children’s rights,” “Unlawful attacks,” “Specifically 
protected persons and objects,” and “Pillaging and destruction of property.”29 
The policy of the U.S. government in the Syria crisis has often been 
criticized for failing to act to protect civilians as it did it in Libya. This was 
particularly the case after the Obama administration decided not to conduct a 
military strike in Syria in response to the Syrian government having crossed a 
 
 23 Rep. of the Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Libya to the Human Rights Council at its Nineteenth Session, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/68 (Mar. 2, 2012). 
 24 Human Rights Council Res. S-16/1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/S-16/1, ¶ 7 (Apr. 29, 2011). 
 25 See Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic: About the 
Commission of Inquiry, OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS., http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/
IICISyria/Pages/IndependentInternationalCommission.aspx (last visited Nov. 4, 2015). 
 26 Rep. of the Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic to the Human Rights Council 
at its Thirteenth Session, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/30/48, ¶ 4 (Aug. 13, 2015) [hereinafter Report on the Syrian Arab 
Republic 2015]. 
 27 Crying Out for Justice: The Continued Plight of Syrian Civilians, HUM. RTS. COUNCIL (Sept. 22, 
2015), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/CryingOutforJusticeSyrianCivilians.aspx.  
 28 See generally Report on the Syrian Arab Republic 2015, supra note 26.  
 29 Rep. of the Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic to the Human Rights Council 
at its Twenty-Second Session, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/59, at 3–4 (Feb. 5, 2013).  
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“red-line” by its undoubted use of chemical weapons in the attack on Ghouta in 
August 2013. But such a strike would have had to be undertaken without 
international legal authorization, as Russia would certainly have vetoed any 
U.N. Security Council resolution similar to UNSCR 1973. President Obama 
was also faulted by his critics for rejecting a 2012 plan, supported by Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, to provide the 
“moderate” Syrian armed opposition with substantial training and weaponry.30 
Even when the decision was finally made in 2014 to “train and equip” such 
groups, it was only to fight the forces of the Islamic State in Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL), with no assistance provided to fight the forces of the Assad 
regime. Indeed, there was no assurance that they would be protected if attacked 
by Assad forces—a fatal flaw as Assad’s forces were far more vigorously 
targeting the “moderate” groups than they were ISIL. By September 2015, 
General Lloyd Austin, the head of U.S. Central Command, testified in 
Congress that there were only “four or five” such trained and equipped 
individuals remaining in the fight.31 
But the U.S. has been strong and consistent in pushing for judicial 
accountability on every currently available avenue and in laying the 
groundwork for future trials in national, hybrid, or international courts. The 
U.S. supported the French resolution in May 2014 to refer the Syria situation to 
the ICC and actively encouraged other Security Council members to vote in 
the affirmative helping achieve thirteen “yes” votes in the face of the Russian 
and Chinese vetoes. At the same time, it most strongly advocated for 
consideration of a hybrid court believing that such an institution would have 
stronger support among the Syrian people and a better chance of success in 
bringing high-level perpetrators to account in a region where only two states 
(Jordan and Tunisia) were ICC members. Of course, such hybrid courts have 
only been established by agreements between the host states and the U.N. or 
other multilateral organizations, and the creation of one would have to await 
the transition to a Syrian government willing to accept independent justice. 
 
 30 Jon Swaine, Leon Panetta Supports Hillary Clinton Plan to Arm Syrian Rebels, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 7, 
2013, 8:54 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9856382/Leon-Panetta-
supports-Hillary-Clinton-plan-to-arm-Syrian-rebels.html.  
 31 Nabih Bulos, US-Trained Division 30 Rebels ‘betray US and hands weapons over to al-Qaeda’s 
affiliate in Syria,’ TELEGRAPH (Sept. 22, 2015, 5:22 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
middleeast/syria/11882195/US-trained-Division-30-rebels-betrayed-US-and-hand-weapons-over-to-al-Qaedas-
affiliate-in-Syria.html. 
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In the absence of independent courts with present jurisdiction, the U.S. has 
placed the greatest emphasis on strengthening efforts to document the ongoing 
crimes so that the evidence will be available on the day that justice becomes 
possible. This was underlined by its consistent support in the UNHRC of the 
Syria CoI, and of its co-sponsorship of all of the eight resolutions that 
mandated continuing investigations. But the U.S. also led efforts to go above 
and beyond these Geneva-based inquiries. This was born of the recognition 
that while the Syria CoI was filing excellent narrative reports, it was not in the 
business of preserving evidence for future prosecutions. As with other 
UNHRC-mandated inquiries, it relied largely on interviews of witnesses who 
were promised confidentiality because it was unable to provide continuing 
protection. The Syria CoI did not have the capacity to capture and analyze the 
hundreds of thousands of pages of regime documents that had become 
available in Syria or to do similar work on the enormous numbers of mobile-
phone videos of scenes of carnage in Syria that were accessible on the internet 
and on social media. 
This is why Secretary Hillary Clinton launched the initiative to create a 
Syria Justice and Accountability Center (SJAC) in a speech to a meeting of the 
Friends of the Syrian People in Istanbul in April 2012.32 This center was to 
serve as a hub for efforts to engage Syrians in the collection, preservation, and 
analysis of documentation to ensure that there would be abundant credible 
evidence for future accountability processes. A donors’ conference was held in 
Rabat, Morocco, in September 2012 in which more than forty governments 
participated.33 By February 2013, the U.S. State Department was able to report 
that the SJAC was up and running and to describe its work as follows: 
The Syria Justice and Accountability Center (SJAC) is an 
independent entity that focuses on: 1) Collection and analysis of 
documentation related to ongoing violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law (IHL) in Syria; 2) Coordination of 
Syrian and international actors working on documentation and 
transitional justice efforts; and 3) Education and outreach on 
transitional justice concepts and processes. 
The SJAC has built a network of nearly 70 Syrian human rights 
activists largely within Syria working on documentation of human 
rights and IHL abuses.  
 
 32 See Fact Sheet: The Syria Justice & Accountability Center, U.S. DEP’T STATE (Feb. 20, 2013), http:// 
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/02/205031.htm.  
 33 Id. 
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The SJAC has signed agreements with 10 local and international 
organizations, such as the Center for Documentation of Violations in 
Syria (VCD) and the Syria Commission on Justice and 
Accountability to provide information and document abuses and 
violations of international law.34 
Under the terms of one of the agreements, SJAC provided the Syria 
Commission on Justice and Accountability (now known as the Commission on 
International Justice and Accountability, or CIJA) with one million dollars to 
bring out of Syria up to one million pages of documents, to download 470,000 
videos, and to begin the analysis of this material to determine individual 
criminal responsibility.35 The early success of this project led to direct funding 
of CIJA from other donors that by 2014 allowed the CIJA annual budget to rise 
to almost six million dollars.36 This funding permitted the hiring and 
deployment of a staff of 135, most of them Syrians, to build solid cases for 
future prosecution. By late 2015, CIJA had prepared cases against more than 
two dozen senior officials of the Syrian regime.37 At the same time, a search 
capacity was developed that was being shared with those national prosecutors 
in Europe or North America who had begun to look for suspects over whom 
they had jurisdiction.38 
The U.S. has also provided support to efforts to analyze and make available 
the evidence of a military police photographer, code-named “Caesar,” who 
defected in August 2013.39 He had been part of a team of up to eleven 
photographers that were required to take more than 55,000 photos of the bodies 
of persons tortured to death in Syrian government custody after which those 
bodies were delivered to a military hospital in Damascus.40 Using digital 
memory sticks he smuggled the photos out of the hospital, and eventually out 
of Syria. The images show humans starved and eviscerated, their skin carved 
 
 34 State Dept. Fact Sheet on Syria Justice and Accountability Center, U.S. EMBASSY: LONDON, UK 
(Feb. 20, 2013), http://london.usembassy.gov/midest272.html.  
 35 Julian Borger, Syria’s Truth Smugglers, GUARDIAN (May 12, 2015, 3:10 PM), http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2015/may/12/syria-truth-smugglers-bashar-al-assad-war-crimes.  
 36 See Colum Lynch, Exclusive: Washington Cuts Funds for Investigating Bashar al-Assad’s War 
Crimes, FOREIGN POL’Y (Nov. 3, 2014, 10:18 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/03/exclusive-
washington-cuts-funds-for-investigating-bashar-al-assads-war-crimes/.  
 37 Borger, supra note 35. 
 38 Id. 
 39 MARK LATTIMER, SHABNAM MOJTAHEDI & LEE ANNA TUCKER, CEASEFIRE & SYRIA JUST. & 
ACCOUNTABILITY CTR., A STEP TOWARDS JUSTICE: CURRENT ACCOUNTABILITY OPTIONS FOR CRIMES UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMITTED IN SYRIA 24 (2015), http://33bjjc3l8q7dpgn6j1rg637f.wpengine.netdna-
cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/A-Step-towards-Justice1.pdf.  
 40 Id. 
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with knives and burned by chemical agents, their eyes gauged and bones 
broken—horrendous acts done to people with the horror of the last hours of 
their lives still on their faces. The photos were taken of at least 11,000 humans 
who were tortured in the prisons of the Syrian state security services, with the 
number of the facility marked on the body and on a white card held next to the 
body for each photograph.41 
Together with his family, Caesar was provided with refuge and protection 
in a third country in June 2014, and was hosted in Washington between July 27 
and August 2, 2014, where he met with senior officials of the U.S. government 
and with the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The FBI analyzed all of the 
metadata accompanying Caesar’s digital images and prepared a forensic report. 
It further permitted disclosure of its findings as to the images that “there were 
no artifacts or inconsistencies indicating that they had been manipulated” and 
that they “appear to depict real people and events.”42 The U.S. State 
Department’s Office of Global Criminal Justice (formerly known as the Office 
of War Crimes Issues) became a custodian of the Caesar material as allowed 
by 22 U.S.C. § 8213, which authorizes it to “collect information regarding 
incidents that may constitute crimes against humanity, genocide, slavery, or 
other violations of international humanitarian law.”43 It has since made the 
Caesar photos and the FBI report available to the Syria CoI and to national 
prosecution authorities in Europe that may have jurisdiction to prosecute those 
responsible for the crimes evidenced by the material. 
Indeed, it is at the national level in third countries where the opportunity 
may first arise for credible investigations, prosecutions, and adjudications of 
criminal responsibility. Since 1999 there have been successful prosecutions of 
persons charged with the extraterritorial commission of atrocity crimes by 
authorities in at least thirteen countries, including Switzerland, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom (U.K.), Norway, Sweden, Finland, 
Denmark, Germany, France, Spain, Canada, and the U.S.44 These cases have 
invariably involved a suspect that came to live in the prosecuting country, 
 
 41 Id. 
 42 Stav Ziv, Syria Torture Photos ‘Depict Real People and Events’: FBI Report, NEWSWEEK (July 22, 
2015, 5:55 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/syria-torture-photos-depict-real-people-and-events-fbi-report-
356057.  
 43 Investigations of Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 22 U.S.C. § 8213(a) (2007).  
 44 REDRESS & INT’L FED’N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, STRATEGIES FOR THE EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION AND 
PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: THE PRACTICE OF SPECIALISED WAR CRIMES UNITS 5 
(2010), http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/The_Practice_of_Specialised_War_Crimes_Units_
Dec_2010.pdf.  
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often claiming refugee status as a victim of atrocities, but later identified as a 
possible perpetrator. The legal basis for these prosecutions has been “universal 
jurisdiction”45 but the domestic laws invariably required a significant interest 
or connection to the prosecuting state, usually that the defendant was “present 
in” its territory, though some required that the individual have obtained some 
kind of resident status. 
To date, only Sweden has prosecuted a case involving an alleged atrocity 
committed in Syria, and that was of a former member of the Free Syrian Army 
(FSA) who had been shown on a video made in 2012 mistreating and 
threatening a soldier of the Syrian regular army that the FSA had taken 
prisoner.46 The defendant, Mohannad Droubi, was given refugee status in 
Sweden in 2013 and arrested about ten months later.47 On conviction in 2015, 
he received a sentence of five years in prison.48 
But officials of the Syrian regime who have committed atrocities during 
their fight to dominate and survive are unlikely to be found outside Syria while 
that fight continues. If an international court like the ICC were to have 
jurisdiction of the Syrian crimes, one could envision that arrest warrants would 
issue and wanted posters would circulate but actual arrests would take a long 
time. This could in-and-of-itself be useful, as it would be a warning to others to 
stop or even to desert in order to avoid becoming internationally wanted men 
for the rest of their lives. National prosecution authorities could perform the 
same role if their domestic laws allowed prosecution of persons still in Syria. 
Most of their laws would permit prosecutions of extra-territorial crimes if the 
victim were a citizen or national of the prosecuting state, basing jurisdiction on 
the “passive personality” principle. 
The U.K. has one such possible case in the torture-murder of its citizen Dr. 
Abbas Khan, an orthopedic surgeon who went to Syria in 2012 to treat patients 
in a hospital in a rebel-held area.49 He was soon arrested by the regime and 
reportedly tortured and starved in several prisons before dying just before he 
 
 45 Id. 
 46 Dennis Lynch, Syrian Rebel Mouhannad Droubi Sentenced to 5 Years in Swedish Prison for War 
Crimes, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2015, 10:42 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/syrian-rebel-mouhannad-
droubi-sentenced-5-years-swedish-prison-war-crimes-1829388. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Mark Tran, British Doctor Abbas Khan Unlawfully Killed in Syrian Prison, Jury Says, GUARDIAN 
(Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/27/british-doctor-abbas-khan-unlawfully-killed-
syria-jury-inquest.  
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was purportedly to be released.50 Under diplomatic pressure, his embalmed 
body was returned to the U.K., where a jury found that he was “deliberately 
and intentionally killed without any legal justification.”51 British authorities are 
investigating to determine whether to prosecute any responsible individuals.52 
But who should be the defendant(s) that would be charged in the U.K.? The 
doctor’s mother and another witness testified that he had been tortured in 
Prison 235, the so-called “Palestine branch”53 of the Syrian security services. 
Dr. Khan died in December 2013, four months after Caesar defected, but 
Caesar’s photos can prove that torture was being committed in Prison 235 
based on the photos of fresh bodies that arrived at the military hospital during 
the period when Dr. Khan was in custody in Prison 235. The identity of the 
officers in charge of Prison 235 and its operations may be found in the 
documents gathered and analyzed by CIJA or discovered by interviewing 
persons who survived torture in the prison and who are now among the tens of 
thousands of refugees that have reached Europe. 
The presence of those refugees and the pressures on public services that 
they create also now give European authorities a solid public interest basis to 
exercise universal jurisdiction for the crime of torture that is recognized under 
international law as embodied in the Convention Against Torture of 1984,54 to 
the extent that the prosecutions meet conditions required under their domestic 
statutes. On September 30, 2015, Laurent Fabius, the Foreign Minister of 
France, announced that French authorities had opened such an investigation 
into torture committed in Syria as revealed in the Caesar photographs.55 The 
applicable French law, Penal Code Article 689-2, would appear to permit a full 
investigation to be undertaken in France, but actual prosecutions would require 
the defendant(s) be found in France.56 
 
 50 Id. 
 51 Lynch, supra note 46.  
 52 Tran, supra note 49. 
 53 Amnesty International Report 2014/15, AMNESTY INT’L, https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/
middle-east-and-north-africa/syria/report-syria/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2015). 
 54 See generally Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987). 
 55 Adam Nossiter, France Opens Criminal Investigation of Torture in Syria Under Assad, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/01/world/europe/france-investigates-syria-torture-bashar-
assad.html?_r=0.  
 56 See The Scope and Application of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, Rep. of the Permanent 
Mission of France to the Secretariat of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. AT/SEC214 (Apr. 27, 2010), http://
www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/65/ScopeAppUniJuri_StatesComments/France_E.pdf.  
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The criminal law in Germany allows for full exercise of universal 
jurisdiction in cases of torture. This means that German authorities could 
prosecute officials57 in Syria responsible for acts of torture without a victim or 
perpetrator needing to be present in Germany. Such prosecutions are at the 
discretion of the German Federal Prosecutor.58 Factors weighing in favor of 
such a prosecution would be the absence of any credible prosecutions in other 
national or international courts and the impact on Germany of the tens of 
thousands of Syrian refugees who have been driven to flight by the torture and 
other atrocities perpetrated by officers of the Syrian regime. In fact, Germany 
will be the country most affected by the influx of Syrian refugees given 
Chancellor Angela Merkel’s vow that it will remain a haven for refugees and 
her government’s expectation that 800,000 will arrive in 2015 with Syria the 
largest source of the migrants.59 
Of course, bringing significant numbers of major perpetrators to justice will 
require the end of the Syrian conflict and the arrival of a regime that would 
enable the establishment of credible courts. There are those that argue that this 
cannot happen because peace will require the present leader of Syria to be 
allowed to stay in power, in the face of abundant credible evidence that he was 
the most responsible for the massive atrocities committed by his regime. In 
intensive engagement with numerous actors who are seeking solutions to the 
suffering in Syria, I have heard this argument only from non-Syrians. I have 
not heard this line being spoken by any of the survivors of the hundreds of 
thousands of victims of the crimes in Syria. In the Syrian case, peace cannot 
come without justice. Given the massive crimes committed by Assad against 
his own people, particularly against the Sunni majority, it is impossible to see 
him remaining leader of the whole country and his criminal responsibility 
being ignored. Of course, it is difficult to reach a peace agreement with a 
leader who by the terms of the accord could face prosecution. But what 
survivor could accept a peace that leaves a major alleged perpetrator in power 
free to torture and kill again? 
 
 57 Such officials could not include the present Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, or other high-level 
ministers involved in foreign relations under the “Arrest Warrant Case” decided by the ICJ in 2002. See 
generally Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 
I.C.J. Rep. 3 (Feb. 14).  
 58 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN GERMANY 4–7 
(2014), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/IJ0914German.pdf.  
 59 Stefan Wagstyl, Angela Merkel Stands by Refugees Decision Despite Polls, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2015, 
5:14 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0e2aeb36-6a90-11e5-8171-ba1968cf791a.html#axzz3ozBVT8Hl.  
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By 2015, major crimes had been committed on all sides, with the atrocities 
of the jihadists of ISIL becoming the most notorious. The crimes of ISIL and 
other extremists have been further enabled by Assad’s repression of ISIL’s 
enemies in the moderate opposition. But there were also factions in Syria, 
including many Christians, who tolerated Assad because they feared that his 
defeat would strengthen the extremists. 
This is why it is so important to include in any peace agreement the 
framework for a judicial process that includes all communities—the 
independence of which can be aided by international participation. It should 
focus on the most responsible, and offer ways to rehabilitate and reconcile with 
those who were drafted into the crimes. But most importantly, it must be a 
system where cases are decided solely on the evidence and not on the basis of 
who comes out on top at the end of the conflict. Thanks to unprecedented 
documentation efforts, largely performed by Syrians with international 
support, the evidence and human capacity will be ready for the day when it 
will become possible to achieve justice for the victims and survivors of the 
mass atrocities committed in Syria. 
 
